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Policy deep-dive ——— Venues & public assets

Every big stage in Portland belongs to you.So do the bills.

The court the Blazers play on. The stadium where the Timbers sell out. The hall where the symphony plays, the stage the Broadway tours land on, the square with the holiday tree. If Portland gathers there, odds are Portland owns it. You own it. Over the next ten years these buildings need repairs that could top a billion dollars, and nobody at City Hall can tell you what any of them earns, what any of them costs, or which one deserves the next dollar. This is an accounting of what you own, and a plan for running it well.

2M+
People through these venues every year
$1B+
Bills that could come due by 2036
$573M
The biggest single renovation on the table
C
Our grade for how it's all managed
01 · For the elected reader

One page you could govern by

Everything below argues for a single management philosophy. Here it is up front: quotable, printable, and short enough to survive a work session.

Portland Civic LabVenue Portfolio Doctrine2026

The one question this whole page exists to answer

Where does the next public dollar do the most lasting good?

Said fully: Of everything we could do with the next public dollar, which choice gives Portlanders the most lasting benefit, once you count the risk, the upkeep, the subsidy it will need, the money it can earn, its cultural value, and everything else that dollar could have done instead?

How a city gets to a good answer

Act like one owner, let specialists run the shows, keep one set of books, subsidize on purpose and in the open, save for repairs before they come due, and make every project compete for the same public dollar.

Spelled out as ten promises

  1. Run every venue as one collection, with one strategy
  2. Let specialists keep running the shows
  3. Keep a real set of books for every building: what it earns, what it costs, what it needs
  4. Never blur the venues that should make money with the ones we support on purpose
  5. When we build new, we replace the old; we don't pay for two of the same thing
  6. If a project mostly profits a private operator, private money pays for it
  7. Public money buys public benefits, and we name the benefit we're buying
  8. Before raising taxes, get fair value from the land, parking, and naming rights we already own
  9. Fund the roof and the boiler before the nice-to-haves
  10. Rank every proposed project in public, so everyone can see what beat what

And five questions every project answers before it gets a dollar

01

Do we have to?

Is this required to keep the building safe, accessible, and legal to operate?

02

Who gets what?

Before a dollar moves, do we know who earns, who pays, who covers overruns, and who eats the downside?

03

Do we already own one?

Would this duplicate another building the public already pays for?

04

Can we keep it up?

A grand opening is not a capital plan: who pays for the next thirty years of upkeep?

05

What if it goes badly?

Does it still work in a recession, with a cost overrun, in a bad year at the box office?

Ask it every year, in public

Until the city can answer the question at the top of this card, about every dollar, no single venue proposal, however popular, is a complete plan.

The framework, grades, and doctrine on this page are Portland Civic Lab, our synthesis of the public record. Every load-bearing figure links to its source; everything we could not verify is listed in the Method section.

02 · The complete perimeter

What Portland owns, and who actually runs it

These venues are split across a City program, an arts office, a parks bureau, a regional government, nonprofit managers, and private operators. That split is why nobody can answer the basic questions an owner should.

The city, dotted with what you own

Spectator venuesPerforming arts & cultureParks & civic spaces
PORTLANDI-5I-84COLUMBIA RIVERWILLAMETTENDOWNTOWNPIR1East Delta2IFCC3Coliseum4Moda Center5Erv Lind6Music Center13Walker Stadium14Sckavone15Arts Center16DOWNTOWN · MAGNIFIEDProvidence Park7Schnitzer8Hatfield9Pioneer Square10Waterfront11Keller12
  1. 1Portland International Raceway · on the site of Vanport
  2. 2East Delta fields
  3. 3Interstate Firehouse Cultural Center
  4. 4Veterans Memorial Coliseum
  5. 5Moda Center
  6. 6Erv Lind Stadium
  7. 7Providence Park
  8. 8Arlene Schnitzer Concert Hall
  9. 9Antoinette Hatfield Hall
  10. 10Pioneer Courthouse Square
  11. 11Tom McCall Waterfront Park
  12. 12Keller Auditorium
  13. 13Community Music Center
  14. 14Walker Stadium · the Pickles' park
  15. 15Sckavone Stadium
  16. 16Multnomah Arts Center

Dots sized by venue scale · downtown magnified for legibility · geography real, positions schematic

Ring 1

4 venues

Spectator Venues & Visitor Activities

City program within Community & Economic Development

  • Moda Center
  • Veterans Memorial Coliseum
  • Providence Park
  • Rose Quarter garages, plazas & land

People through them

1.3M+

FY24–25, the arena alone (1,339,100). Providence Park's ~150 sold-out event days come on top; no public total exists.

What the City clears from them

Not published

No venue-by-venue owner statement exists. That gap is this page's core finding.

Public money going in now

$56M

The Coliseum renovation underway, with $120M more proposed for the arena.

Figures: City of Portland

Funded by ticket and user fees, Rose Quarter parking, agreement revenues, and allocations from the Multnomah County Visitor Facilities Trust Account (lodging and rental-car taxes).

Ring 2

5 venues

Portland'5: five theaters, three City-owned buildings

Arts & Culture oversight; Metro/MERC operates through June 30, 2027

  • Keller Auditorium
  • Arlene Schnitzer Concert Hall
  • Newmark Theatre
  • Winningstad Theatre
  • Brunish Theatre

People through them

798,347

FY24–25, across 710 events in the five theaters.

What they earned

$21.0M

Charges for services, all five venues, FY24–25.

What they cost on top

$4.5M

The FY24–25 operating and capital shortfall, covered publicly.

Figures: City of Portland / Portland'5 · City of Portland / Portland'5

Management returns to the City on July 1, 2027, the largest operational handoff in the portfolio's history.

Ring 3

10 venues

Parks & civic-event assets

Portland Parks & Recreation, nonprofit managers, tenants

  • Portland International Raceway
  • Pioneer Courthouse Square
  • Walker Stadium
  • Erv Lind Stadium
  • Sckavone Stadium
  • East Delta fields
  • Interstate Firehouse Cultural Center
  • Community Music Center
  • Multnomah Arts Center
  • Waterfront Park & programmable public spaces

People through them

Not tracked

Nobody counts attendance across these venues as a group.

What they earn

Not published

Rents and permit fees sit in scattered ledgers, never rolled up.

What they cost

~$470K+

The City's Pioneer Square contribution alone, per the 2022–25 agreement. The rest is unpublished.

Figures: Portland City Council

Not all are managed identically, but all belong in the same public asset register. The Oregon Convention Center and Expo Center are Metro assets: comparables and complements, not City holdings.

Moda Center

Owner
City of Portland
Operator / manager
Rip City Management
City oversight
Spectator Venues

Veterans Memorial Coliseum

Owner
City of Portland
Operator / manager
Rose Quarter operating structure
City oversight
Spectator Venues

Providence Park

Owner
City of Portland
Operator / manager
Peregrine Sports / team operator
City oversight
Spectator Venues

Portland'5 buildings

Owner
City of Portland
Operator / manager
Metro/MERC through June 2027
City oversight
Arts & Culture

Portland International Raceway

Owner
City of Portland
Operator / manager
City / Parks
City oversight
Parks & Recreation

Pioneer Courthouse Square

Owner
Public asset
Operator / manager
Nonprofit manager
City oversight
City agreement oversight

Smaller Parks venues

Owner
City
Operator / manager
Parks, tenants, permittees
City oversight
Parks & Recreation

The report card

  • Operational continuityB+
  • Financial transparencyC−
  • Capital planningC−
  • Contract & commercial-right managementC
  • Data & performance managementD+
  • Portfolio strategyD+

Overall

C

A grade of the system as an owner, not a claim that any individual staffer is bad at their job.

Graded from the public record. These grades reflect what the city publishes and what public records show. The city may hold internal reporting we could not see. If it exists and surfaces, we will update the grades accordingly, and say so.

What a first-class owner always knows

  1. 01Every revenue right
  2. 02Every maintenance obligation
  3. 03Every capital obligation
  4. 04Each building's cash flow
  5. 05Attendance, event by event
  6. 06Whether operators hold up their end
  7. 07How long the major systems have left
  8. 08Land and development value
  9. 09What else the money could do, for every project proposed

Portland cannot currently answer all of these from one system.

The problem is not outsourcing. Specialists can beat government at booking, concessions, and event production. The problem is outsourcing with nobody strong on the owner's side of the table: contracts going out the door faster than anyone can watch them.

03 · The accounting problem

Four kinds of money, routinely blurred together

An arena can pack downtown restaurants every game night while the city that owns it barely breaks even. A concert hall can lose money on paper and still be exactly what the public wants its money spent on. Until the city keeps these books separately, every venue argument is two people talking past each other: one is counting the region's money, the other is counting the city's.

One sold-out night, four ledgers.

Schematic
Ledger 1A sold-out night
2Operators: teams, promoters, concessionaires
3The City, as owner
4The region: hotels, restaurants, taxes

Ledger 1 is everything fans spend that night: tickets, beer, parking, merch. The three ribbons show who actually keeps that money.

Ribbon widths are illustrative, not measured. These are four different sets of books, and the only one Portland publishes is the first: the total spent, which says nothing about who kept it.

What each ledger actually measures

1

Gross venue activity

Tickets, concessions, hotels, restaurants, visitor spending: the big number that shows up in press releases. It measures the party, not who paid for the room.

2

Operator economics

The cash actually captured by teams, promoters, concessionaires, and managers. This is where most of the money in a busy building goes.

3

Public-owner economics

What the City itself receives or pays. A venue can fill every seat and still hand its owner a loss. This is the ledger Portland cannot currently produce building by building.

4

Regional economic & fiscal impact

Incremental activity and tax revenue across the region. Real, but never a substitute for the owner's own books, and never to be mixed with them.

When someone says a venue is “losing money”

That phrase hides three different situations. They call for three different responses, and mixing them up is how cities make expensive mistakes.

1

It should make money, and doesn't

This venue exists to earn. If it isn't earning enough for the public that owns it, the answer is to negotiate like an owner and insist on a fair deal.

Assets here: Moda Center and Providence Park. Both should be making real money for their owner.

2

We're paying for it on purpose

The city is buying something tickets alone can't pay for: symphonies, school shows, community stages. That's a purchase, not a failure. But we should say what it costs and what we get.

Assets here: The Schnitzer, on purpose. Winningstad and Brunish maybe, though nobody has ever said what that subsidy buys.

3

Good venue, failing building

The shows are strong; the structure is the problem. Keeping this exact building standing will eventually cost more than it's worth. The operation deserves a future. The building may not.

Assets here: Keller is the textbook case: a moneymaker inside a building that's wearing out. Hatfield Hall may be next.

Each box above has its own fix. If a venue should make money and doesn't, the city should drive a harder bargain. If we're paying for it on purpose, the city should say what we're buying. And if the building itself is failing, the question is the building, not the shows inside it.

Portland'5 shows the weakness plainly: the performing-arts workgroup had to model how costs split across the buildings, because clean books were never kept for any one of them. Every venue needs two scorecards, one for the owner's money and one for the public value, and the two must never be blended into a single number.

Should cultural venues have to pay their way?

The case for making it pay

  • Losses grow in the dark
  • If we're buying something, say what it is

The case for paying for it

  • The point was never profit
  • Charge full price and you lose the point

Where the evidence lands

Pay for it in the open, never through the back door.

The full argument

The case for making it pay

Once a deficit is accepted, nobody looks at it again. With no pressure to earn, costs creep up and repairs get skipped, until the bill arrives as an emergency.

When the public covers a venue's losses, someone should be able to answer three questions: what did we get, who got it, and what did it cost per person in the seats?

The case for paying for it

What a concert hall produces includes school kids at their first symphony and local companies that could never pay commercial rent. Grading the Schnitzer on profit is like grading a library on late fees.

If every group has to cover full cost, the first ones priced out are the school shows, the community groups, and the cultural events these buildings exist to host.

The reasoning: Both sides are right about how the other goes wrong. The fix is two scorecards for every venue: one for the owner's money, one for the public good. Venues meant to make money must show a real public return and someone else holding the risk. Venues meant to serve must show, in numbers, what the public got, plus an upkeep plan the City can afford. What no venue gets is the middle fog, where a deficit is neither a price we agreed to pay nor a failure anyone is fixing, just a number nobody owns.

04 · What the buildings actually do

Event count is not utilization

The portfolio is not suffering from lack of demand. It is suffering from an owner who counts events instead of people and dollars.

A busy calendar is not a full house.

Winningstad hosted 100 events for fewer than 14,000 people; Keller hosted 179 for nearly 400,000.

Keller Auditorium

Essentially recovered from the pandemic
% of events
25.2%
% of attendance
49.5%
% of revenue
51.2%

Arlene Schnitzer Concert Hall

Still below FY2019 attendance
% of events
28.0%
% of attendance
36.8%
% of revenue
34.8%

Newmark Theatre

Materially below FY2019
% of events
20.8%
% of attendance
10.7%
% of revenue
11.2%

Winningstad Theatre

Fallen particularly sharply
% of events
14.1%
% of attendance
1.7%
% of revenue
2.1%

Brunish Theatre

Small-scale community utility
% of events
9.4%
% of attendance
0.7%
% of revenue
0.5%

Lobby / other

% of events
2.4%
% of attendance
0.6%
% of revenue
0.1%
  • Keller Auditorium

    179 events · 395,255 attendees · $10.7M

  • Arlene Schnitzer Concert Hall

    199 events · 294,058 attendees · $7.3M

  • Newmark Theatre

    148 events · 85,424 attendees · $2.4M

  • Winningstad Theatre

    100 events · 13,805 attendees · $444K

  • Brunish Theatre

    67 events · 5,359 attendees · $109K

  • Lobby / other

    17 events · 4,446 attendees · $20K

  • All Portland'5 venues

    710 events · 798,347 attendees · $20.965M

FY2024–25 · charges-for-services revenue

And the rest of the portfolio

The same three questions for every other venue on this page, from the best public year available. Where a cell says “not published,” that is the finding: nobody can answer the question from the public record.

  • Moda Center

    153 events · 1,339,100

    City's take: Not published

    FY24–25. The City has owned the arena since 2024; no owner statement exists yet.

    City of Portland

  • Veterans Memorial Coliseum

    96 events · 300,156

    City's take: Not published

    FY24–25, with the building closed four months for renovation. Reopened October 2025.

    City of Portland

  • Providence Park

    43 events · 717,910 tickets

    City's take: Essentially nothing

    FY24–25 ticketed events; the City counts tickets sold, not people through the gate. License payments to the City ended in 2017, and the City's own plan says stadium revenues will not cover its costs through 2035 while it spends about $600K a year on repairs.

    City of Portland · City of Portland Budget Office

  • Portland International Raceway

    ~650 events · 400,000+

    City's take: Self-supporting

    FY22–23 actuals: $2.23M revenue against $1.53M expense, 146% direct cost recovery. The rare venue that pays its own way, before long-term repairs.

    Portland Parks & Recreation · City of Portland Budget Office

  • Pioneer Courthouse Square

    300+ events · “10M+ visitors”

    City's take: The City pays ~$470K/yr

    The visitor figure is the Square's own claim; nobody audits it. Programmed events per year.

    Portland Parks & Recreation · Portland City Council

  • Walker Stadium (Pickles)

    28 home games events · 99,787

    City's take: Not published

    2025 season, second-best attendance in the entire West Coast League.

    Wikipedia

  • Smaller venues & event grounds

    Not tracked events · Not tracked

    City's take: Not published

    Erv Lind, Sckavone, East Delta, the cultural centers, Waterfront Park: no rolled-up count exists anywhere.

    Portland Civic Lab

Best available public year per venue · tickets sold and visitor claims are not audited attendance

Why isn't the Schnitzer profitable?

“Why aren't these venues profitable?” has a different answer for each building. For the system's biggest money-loser, the public record lets us be specific. Four causes, in order of size:

  1. 01The business model keeps almost nothing. Portland'5 runs as a host: most of the ticket money flows to the groups on stage, not the building. The system collects $21 per available seat against a $59 peer average, and runs a 2% margin where peers run 12%. That is a model the city chose, not a failure of the people running it. (City of Portland, Office of Arts & Culture)
  2. 02Its main tenants pay mission-discounted rent, on purpose. The resident companies (the symphony, opera, ballet) get the deepest rent reductions of any user tier. What they actually pay has never been published. (Metro Auditor)
  3. 03Its audience hasn't come all the way back. The hall is busy (199 events, 294,058 people) but still down 28% from its 2018 peak, while Broadway at Keller set all-time highs. Touring musicals recovered; symphony nights did not. (The Oregonian (via The Chronicle))
  4. 04A 1917 building with rising costs. Wages, PERS, and inflation forced twelve position cuts in 2025, and repairs get paid out of operating cash, which peer venues do not do. (City of Portland, Office of Arts & Culture)

So: bad management? Mostly no. Three of those four causes are choices the city made, and they may be the right ones. But choices should be priced and named, and today the subsidy is neither.

Venue-level events, attendance, and charges-for-services: City of Portland / Portland'5. Newmark's revenue line carries all Hatfield Hall allocated revenues per that document's own footnote.

Moda Center

1.5M

annual visitors through a ~19,000-seat arena that opened in 1995. The question was never demand. It is whether the City gets a fair share of the money under its contracts. Wikipedia

Providence Park

~150

events a year (matches, concerts, camps) in a 25,000+ seat stadium expanded in 2019 on roughly $75.0M of private money. Proof that strong public venues can attract private capital. Wikipedia

05 · The financial architecture

A dollar, a fund, and a cross-subsidy

Three structures carry the portfolio's money, and each hides something worth seeing.

The Spectator Venues & Visitor Activities Fund

Ticket and user fees, Rose Quarter parking, agreement revenues, and allocations from the Multnomah County Visitor Facilities Trust Account (lodging and rental-car taxes) flow in; Rose Quarter and Providence Park obligations, debt, capital, and visitor-economy commitments flow out. The mistake would be treating this money as free just because it is not General Fund money. Parking revenue, ticket fees, and visitor taxes are still public money that could be doing something else. (Fund structure: City of Portland, Finance; the trust account's lodging and rental-car surcharges: Multnomah County, Multnomah County.)

The 2024 Rose Quarter bridge deal: before and after

Before 2024

The City owned most Rose Quarter land, the Coliseum, garages, and public areas. Moda Center and the adjacent office/retail building were privately owned on City ground-leased land.

After 2024

The arena transferred to the City for $1; the City paid $7.13M, based on independent appraisals, for the remaining private land under part of it; the team committed through October 2030 with an option to 2035. The City became the owner of an aging major-league arena while the much larger renovation-and-lease negotiation stayed unresolved.

More asset value, more strategic control, and more exposure. The dollar was cheap. What the dollar obligates is not. (Portland City Council, City of Portland, Office of the Mayor)

The Portland'5 cross-subsidy

The workgroup's FY2023–24 modeling shows Keller making money on operations while the Schnitzer and Hatfield Hall lose it. The cross-subsidy is not crazy: Keller's box-office strength pays for cultural programming elsewhere. But it means Keller's future and the finances of the whole Portland'5 system rise and fall together: a modest annual operation sitting on top of very large building repair bills. Which forces the choice the city is circling right now: build the new hall at PSU, or fix the one it has.

The Keller-or-PSU choice, spelled out

Here are the numbers on the table, and the honest conditions under which each path wins. Two facts hang over both: a city report found Keller unlikely to survive a major earthquake (OPB), and the city's own feasibility study found there isn't enough demand for two full-scale halls (KOIN (via Yahoo News)). Something happens either way; both never happens.

A new hall at PSU

~$447M

$155M is secured: $137.5M state, $7.6M Prosper Portland, $10.5M pledged. The remaining ~$290M is not.

Fully renovating Keller

~$290M

The city’s own plan: “no resources currently identified” for it.

Keeping Keller alive meanwhile

$6–11M

Near-term repairs through 2030. Cheap insurance either way.

What Keller earns today

$10.7M/yr

179 events, 395,255 people, half the theater system's revenue.

The PSU hall wins if

  • The remaining ~$290M actually gets committed: philanthropy, partners, and any city share, in writing.
  • The operating model is proven before construction money moves: who books it, who staffs it, who covers a bad year.
  • The city values never going dark: a new hall gets built while Keller keeps hosting Broadway, then they trade places. A full Keller renovation closes the only big hall for 19 to 28 months.
  • The state's $137.5M would otherwise walk away. It cannot be redirected to fix Keller.

Fixing Keller wins if

  • The PSU money never fully shows up. $137.5M committed against ~$447M is a down payment, not a plan.
  • The new hall's operating numbers don't pencil: a new building that loses money every year is worse than an old one that earns it.
  • Renovation comes in well under the $290M estimate once scoped seriously, narrowing the price gap with new construction.
  • The city decides a proven earner in hand beats a projection: Keller's $10.7M a year is real today.

And if the PSU hall gets built, what happens to Keller?

The honest options, in the order we'd rank them today: rebuild it as the mid-size hall Portland lacks (1,200–1,800 seats, the gap between the Newmark's 880 and Keller's 2,992, and what the city's own steering committee recommends studying); convert or redevelop the block (a full downtown block whose sale or ground-lease value gets banked for the other theaters' repair bills, not absorbed into the general fund); or keep running it, which only makes sense if the PSU hall never opens. What the city should not do is promise all three at once. The decision point comes after the new hall is open and proven, and not a day before.

Figures: Portland City Council · Säzän Group / Portland'5 · City of Portland / Portland'5 · Portland State University · City of Portland Budget Office

Where we're not neutral

Portland Civic Lab's founder publicly runs Rip City Not Rip Off, an advocacy campaign about the Moda Center deal analyzed on this page. This analysis is built entirely from public sources, every source is labeled, and our paid work excludes the live arena matter. The full policy lives on our Independence page.

06 · Asset by asset

Eleven verdicts

Each building is judged against its own job: the moneymakers on what the City earns and who carries the risk, the cultural venues on what the public gets and whether the repair plan is affordable. Grades are ours; the facts are sourced.

The flagship, bought for a dollar

Moda Center

Paul Allen opened it in October 1995 as the Rose Garden: $262 million, of which the City put in $34.5 million and Allen and his lenders carried the rest. The financing didn't survive: Allen's Oregon Arena Corporation went bankrupt in 2004, creditors took the building, Allen bought it back in 2007, and Moda Health's name went up in 2013. Then, in 2024, the whole arc ended in a single line item: the arena transferred to the City of Portland for one dollar. The dollar bought roughly 1.5 million annual visitors, a major-league anchor tenant, and enormous strategic control. It also bought the biggest building-cost question the City has ever faced in this portfolio.

DemandAStrategic importanceAOwner economicsIncompleteCapital riskVery high

Strengths

  • ≈1.5 million annual visitors
  • Major-league anchor tenant
  • Strong concert and event market
  • Valuable surrounding real estate
  • A big surrounding business in parking and ticket fees

Weaknesses & risks

  • An aging 1995 building with a very large identified renovation need
  • A private operator keeping much of the money the building makes
  • A tangled split of who gets the revenue and who pays for repairs
  • Public money going in with no guarantee the public gets value back
  • Rose Quarter land and development rights sold short inside a bigger arena deal

The question: Not whether the building has users, but whether the public owner captures enough value and transfers enough risk under its contracts.

What Portland should do

Proceed only conditionally.

Keep the NBA, fix the arena, use money already set aside for venues, but only with a hard cap on what the City can lose, private partners on the hook for finishing the job and eating the overruns, the City's right to see the books and audit them, a real share of the upside, and no development rights slipped away in the fine print.

Public record · Oct. 3, 2026PlanningReturn definitive agreements to Council · 2026-12-31View current record →

Sources:WikipediaWikipediaCity of Portland, Spectator VenuesCity of PortlandOPBPortland Civic Lab

Invest in Moda under conditions, or refuse the deal?

Invest, with hard protections

  • Walk away, and the City still owns the problem
  • The City has leverage right now
  • A busy district beats an empty one

Refuse, or hold out for better

  • Public money keeps turning into private profit
  • Relocation threats are the strongest card and the least tested
  • The land can carry a district without the City paying for everything

Where the evidence lands

Conditional yes, and the conditions are the deal.

The full argument

Invest, with hard protections

Since 2024 the arena is City property. Walking away doesn't transfer the aging building's risk to someone else: the owner holds it either way. The question is whether renovation happens with a major tenant locked in or without one.

State bonds, county money, and a term sheet are all on the table at once. That combination has never come together before and may not again.

Rose Quarter land, the biggest long-term prize in the portfolio, is worth more beside a renovated, busy arena than a fading or dark one.

Refuse, or hold out for better

The operator controls much of what the arena earns. Unless the City can see audited numbers, cap its losses, and share in the gains, it risks paying for improvements whose profits flow to private parties. That is the classic arena-deal failure.

A promise that the team stays, and that it binds whoever owns the team next, is only as strong as its enforcement terms. A deal signed against a deadline is a deal negotiated by the deadline.

The Rose Quarter's real-estate value doesn't require the City to fund every eligible project on the list.

The reasoning: Invest only if the City's exposure has a fixed cap anyone can audit, private partners guarantee completion and cover overruns, the stay-in-Portland promise is enforceable and binds future owners, the City gets the books and the right to audit them, the public shares in any major commercial windfall, repairs and replacements are funded from day one, and no land or development rights slip away quietly. The December 31, 2026 target must not override deal quality. If the conditions don't survive negotiation, neither should the deal.

The complement, not the copy

Veterans Memorial Coliseum

Skidmore, Owings & Merrill finished it in 1960: a gray glass-and-aluminum curtain wall around a free-floating concrete bowl, the roof carried on four seventy-foot piers. Portlanders called it the Glass Palace, and in 1961 the city dedicated it to veterans who made the supreme sacrifice. It has survived a demolition proposal (2009), earned a National Register listing the same year, and become the National Trust's first Portland National Treasure (2016). It is worth the most as Moda's complement, not as a smaller copy of it. The renovation is financed and underway; what comes next should be decided by evidence, not by another rendering.

DemandCredibleOwner economicsIncompleteConditionImproving

Strengths

  • Credible demand despite years of partial closure
  • A genuine mid-size niche Moda cannot serve
  • Renovation already substantially financed

Weaknesses & risks

  • Repairs still stacked up beyond the current work
  • The temptation to follow this renovation with another aspirational one

What Portland should do

Finish the current work. Be the complement, not the copy.

After it reopens, count what happens: which events, how many people, what it returns to the City, how many shows were pulled over from Moda versus genuinely new, what upkeep costs, what repairs remain. The next decision should rest on how the reopened building actually performs, not on a concept.

Sources:WikipediaNational Trust for Historic PreservationCity of PortlandPortland Civic Lab

The most underappreciated asset in the portfolio

Rose Quarter land, garages & development rights

The Rose Quarter is not two arenas. It is publicly owned real estate beside major transit lines: parcels, garages, plazas, air rights, reversion clauses. And it sits on ground with a memory. This is lower Albina: in 1956 voters approved the Coliseum's construction, and building it destroyed 476 homes, roughly half of them inhabited by Black families, the first of the clearance waves that I-5 and the Emanuel Hospital expansion would continue. Land like this is exactly what gets quietly undervalued inside an arena negotiation, one schedule-B exhibit at a time. It is also exactly where the district's future carries obligations older than any lease.

DemandStrongOwner economicsCash + option valueCondition & highest useNeeds analysis

Strengths

  • Strong event-linked demand
  • Real money now, and big options kept open for later
  • Right beside transit and the central city

Weaknesses & risks

  • Development rights handed off without an independent appraisal
  • Rebuilding garages as if people will always park this much
  • Arenas left as islands in a sea of parking instead of anchors of a district

What Portland should do

Plan the district as seriously as the arenas.

Keep a parcel-by-parcel record: who owns what, ground leases, easements, parking capacity, garage condition, appraised value, development rights, air rights, reversions. Appraise the land publicly and plan the whole district before any new long-term commitment. Keep the City's options open.

Public record · Oct. 3, 2026PlanningReturn binding development agreements · Concurrent with Moda lease; within 12 months of negotiation startView current record →

Sources:Karen J. Gibson (hosted by City of Portland)Portland City CouncilPortland Civic Lab

Rebuild the Rose Quarter garages as parking, or redevelop the land?

Preserve parking capacity

  • Parking is present-tense money
  • Arena deals assume people can park

Redevelop toward a district

  • Parking demand is not eternal
  • The land is the real prize

Where the evidence lands

The goal is long-term public value, not saving every parking space.

The full argument

Preserve parking capacity

Rose Quarter parking is serious money for Spectator Venues, and it pays real bills now. Event patrons need somewhere to put cars tonight, not in a master plan's phase three.

Operators and promoters judge a venue partly on its parking; letting it degrade in the middle of negotiations lowers the value of the City's own arena.

Redevelop toward a district

Transit, rideshare, event habits, and city travel policy can all change how much parking people need in the long run. Rebuilding the garages just as they were bets decades of money on the shakiest assumption in the portfolio.

Public land beside major transit lines is worth more as a full district built around the arenas than as arenas stranded in a sea of parking garages.

The reasoning: Finish the district master plan, study what the land is best used for, and let the garages' fate follow from that. No garage money spent on the assumption people will park forever, and no development rights handed over without an independent appraisal, competing bids, rent that rises with the project's success, hard deadlines, and the rights returning to the City if the builder doesn't deliver.

The strongest asset, with an unknown attached

Providence Park

Sport has been played on this block since 1893, when the Multnomah Amateur Athletic Club raised a grandstand over what had been a Chinese vegetable garden supplying much of the city's produce. The stadium itself went up in 1926 for $502,000 and has cycled through five names on its way to the loudest proof in the portfolio: every Timbers MLS home match has sold out since 2011, and the 2019 eastside expansion added capacity on roughly $75 million of private money. That is the financing model this analysis keeps asking for, already working. What the City still lacks is a current, complete picture of the building's condition, what it will cost to keep up over its life, and who pays for what under the operator agreement.

DemandExceptionalOwner economicsLikely favorableCapital visibilityIncompleteOverallA−

Strengths

  • Capacity above 25,000; ~150 events annually
  • Strong professional soccer demand
  • $75M of private financing for the 2019 expansion: the financing model working as intended

Weaknesses & risks

  • No complete public study of the building's condition
  • A contract that runs out in 2035, which is closer than it sounds

What Portland should do

Protect it, and know exactly what it costs.

Finish the building-condition study, pin down exactly what the City and the operator each owe, set aside money for long-term upkeep, put a price on every commercial right, and start the 2035 negotiation years before it becomes urgent.

Sources:WikipediaCity of PortlandCity of Portland, Spectator VenuesPortland Civic Lab

A successful venue in an unsustainable building

Keller Auditorium

It opened on the Fourth of July, 1917, as the Public Auditorium. A 1968 modernization kept only seventeen percent of the original structure (mostly two walls) and produced what the critic Ada Louise Huxtable called "a building of unrelieved blandness." The blandness works: Keller is the economic engine of Portland'5, with 179 events, 395,255 attendees, and $10.7 million in charges-for-services revenue in FY2024–25 (more than half the system's earned revenue), inside a building that needs major work for decades to come. That is the distinction the debate keeps missing: Keller is not an unsuccessful venue. It is a successful venue in a building that, over the long run, may be too expensive to keep standing.

Commercial performanceADemandAPhysical sustainabilityD / C−

Strengths

  • Earns more than any other Portland'5 venue
  • 179 events, 395,255 attendees (FY2024–25)
  • Over half of Portland'5 charges-for-services revenue

Weaknesses & risks

  • Poor physical condition; big repair bills for decades
  • $290M renovation estimate in Resolution 2026-270 materials
  • The risk of ending up with two big Broadway halls if a PSU hall proceeds

What Portland should do

Keep it as the bridge, not as a second Broadway hall forever.

Don't close it early, and don't run two Broadway halls forever. If a new Broadway-capable PSU venue goes ahead, the question becomes what replaces Keller and what the building does next, decided only after the new hall is fully up and running.

Public record · Oct. 3, 2026PlanningDevelop the PSU Project Commitment Agreement · 2026-12-01View current record →

Sources:WikipediaPortland City CouncilSäzän Group / Portland'5City of Portland / Portland'5Portland Civic Lab

Subsidy, stated plainly

Arlene Schnitzer Concert Hall

It opened in 1928 as a movie palace (the Portland Publix, renamed the Paramount two years later), and by 1982 it was deteriorated enough that the city condemned it, paid the owner $4.1 million, spent $10 million restoring it, and relit a replica of the original rooftop sign: PORTLAND, in five-foot neon. Today it is culturally central and heavily used (199 events, 294,058 attendees in FY2024–25), and the money it earns does not cover what it costs to run once every expense is counted. Call that what it is: the public paying for culture on purpose, not a management failure. The discipline is knowing exactly what the subsidy costs and what it buys.

Cultural demandStrongEarned economicsDeficitCapital needMajor

Strengths

  • Strong cultural demand; the resident organizations' home
  • Historic building with civic identity

Weaknesses & risks

  • Loses serious money on operations each year
  • Big repair bills over the long term
  • Attendance still below FY2019

What Portland should do

Keep it, and name the subsidy out loud.

The right questions: what is the public getting for its money, what repairs will keep the building standing, how much do the resident organizations chip in, how much can donors raise, and is the subsidy per attendee still reasonable? Break the repair work into phases and say plainly how each one is paid for.

Public record · Oct. 3, 2026ImplementationOperator proposals due, 3 p.m. PDT · 2026-10-14View current record →

Sources:WikipediaSäzän Group / Portland'5City of Portland / Portland'5Portland Civic Lab

Three theaters, one building, three different answers

Antoinette Hatfield Hall

Built in 1987 as the New Theatre Building and renamed for Oregon's former First Lady in 2007, it holds three theaters under one roof, sharing one big repair bill. The three draw very different crowds. The question is not which theater to kill. It is: what is the cheapest way, over the long run, to house the programs Portland actually wants?

NewmarkRetain & modernizeWinningstadTest consolidationBrunishMission over building

Strengths

  • A useful mid-sized niche (Newmark)
  • Small-scale community and education programming (Winningstad, Brunish)

Weaknesses & risks

  • A big repair bill shared across the whole building
  • Winningstad attendance fallen sharply from FY2019
  • The mission trotted out to justify every building expense automatically

Newmark Theatre: the strongest case

About 85,400 attendees across 148 events in FY2024–25. A genuine mid-sized theater niche, with a credible long-term role, possibly in a reconfigured building.

Winningstad Theatre: events without audiences

100 events, roughly 13,800 attendees. The clearest proof in the portfolio that a full calendar is not the same as full seats.

Brunish Theatre: small utility, big building bill

67 events, about 5,400 attendees. Real value to the community. But the mission should not automatically pick up the tab for every future building repair.

What Portland should do

Keep the programs. Rethink the building.

Find out whether Newmark can stand apart, physically and financially, from the weaker pieces, and whether Winningstad and Brunish's programs could run well in cheaper space. Combining them is not abandoning them if the programs survive and the long-term bills shrink.

Public record · Oct. 3, 2026ImplementationOperator proposals due, 3 p.m. PDT · 2026-10-14View current record →

Sources:WikipediaSäzän Group / Portland'5City of Portland / Portland'5Portland Civic Lab

Consolidate Hatfield Hall, or preserve all three theaters as they are?

Consolidate into fewer rooms

  • The numbers are not close
  • Mission is portable; square footage is not

Keep all three as they are

  • Small stages are the pipeline
  • Consolidation costs are real too

Where the evidence lands

Ask the right question, then test it.

The full argument

Consolidate into fewer rooms

Newmark drew about 85,400 people in FY2024–25; Winningstad about 13,800 across 100 events; Brunish about 5,400 across 67. Rebuilding all three exactly as they are means paying for three theaters' worth of costs to serve one theater's crowd.

Community and education programming can survive, even improve, in a smaller, smarter set of rooms. What can't survive is a capital plan that treats every room as sacred.

Keep all three as they are

Winningstad and Brunish serve school shows, community companies, and culturally specific programming that a commercial mid-size hall never will. Cut the small rooms and you cut the entry point.

Combining theaters is still construction: design fees, disruption, months of dark stages. Whatever it saves has to be weighed against the cost of the rebuild.

The reasoning: The question is not which theater to kill. It is: what is the cheapest arrangement of buildings, counting decades of upkeep, that still delivers the cultural services Portland actually wants? Test whether Newmark can be run apart from the struggling rooms, and whether Winningstad and Brunish's missions can be delivered in leaner spaces. Consolidation is not abandonment if it protects the programming and cuts what the building costs over its life.

An enterprise hiding inside a parks bureau

Portland International Raceway

The raceway sits on the grave of a city. Vanport was wartime housing for Kaiser shipyard workers, nearly 40,000 people, Oregon's second-largest city. It drowned on Memorial Day 1948 when a railroad berm gave way; fifteen people died and eighteen thousand lost their homes by nightfall. Portland acquired the emptied site in 1960 with an intact street grid and little else, and the first races ran on Vanport's own streets (Cottonwood, Lake, Victory Boulevard), with leftover foundations as trackside hazards into the 1970s. Today PIR is a business the City runs inside its parks bureau: ticketed events, a loyal user community, real revenue coming in. Its danger is the oldest one in public enterprise: treating this year's positive cash flow as surplus while the asset quietly consumes itself.

Niche demandStrongOperating contributionPositiveLifecycle fundingReserve concern

Strengths

  • Distinctive regional niche with an established user community
  • Ticketed events, sponsorship and commercial potential
  • Brings in more than it spends, year to year

Weaknesses & risks

  • No public plan for long-term upkeep
  • The surplus looks real only because future repairs aren't counted yet

What Portland should do

Keep it, run it like a business, and save the surplus for the track.

Business discipline, in order: (1) figure out what the track really clears in a normal year; (2) map what every part of it will need over the next 20–30 years; (3) set up a repair reserve that is not optional; (4) keep the track's own earnings to fill it; (5) only then look at commercial expansion. Cash in hand is not surplus until future repairs are funded.

Sources:WikipediaPortland International RacewayPortland Civic Lab

Civic infrastructure, not a profit center

Pioneer Courthouse Square

For sixty years this block was the Portland Hotel; for thirty more it was the parking lot a department store razed it for. The square that replaced the parking lot in 1984 was paid for partly by fifty thousand Portlanders buying inscribed bricks at $750,000 total, and the hotel's wrought-iron gate still stands on the eastern edge. "Portland's living room" is the rare cliché that is simply accurate: free public use, civic assembly, festivals, vigils, corporate rentals. It runs on a mix of City support (≈$470,000 a year under the 2022–25 agreement), event fees, sponsorship, and donations. Profit is the wrong measuring stick. The right one is keeping the commercial side and the civic side visible, each on its own.

Civic valueAProgrammingA−TransparencyCOverallB−

Strengths

  • Civic and symbolic value: A
  • Programming potential: A−
  • Downtown identity, a magnet for tourists, constant media presence

Weaknesses & risks

  • Commercial performance B−/incomplete; financial transparency C
  • Paid events quietly crowding out ordinary public use
  • What the next management agreement actually says has never been laid out in public

What Portland should do

Keep professional management, but under a performance-based agreement.

Score it on what it exists for: free-programming hours, genuinely open public days, unique attendance, subsidy per programmed public hour, maintenance, safety, community participation, and the share of programming accessible without charge. Report commercial statements separately, so a corporate rental and a civic vigil stop hiding inside one undifferentiated event count.

Sources:WikipediaPortland Parks & RecreationPortland City CouncilPortland Civic Lab

The best return nobody measures

The smaller venues

Walker, Erv Lind, and Sckavone stadiums; East Delta's fields; the Interstate Firehouse Cultural Center; the Community Music Center; Multnomah Arts Center; the amphitheaters and Waterfront Park. This is the least visible ring of the portfolio, and possibly its highest public value per dollar. Walker Stadium shows the model: a 1956 ballpark in Lents Park, named for the Parks Bureau's first Sports Director, that the Portland Pickles took over in 2016 under an agreement allocating rent, cleaning, security, and maintenance. It seats about 1,500 and has squeezed in 4,387: the kind of over-capacity night no spreadsheet in the city currently records.

UsageUnevenDocumentationPoorMarginal returnPotentially highest

Strengths

  • Locally valuable, often heavily used
  • Small capital dollars buy visible improvements: lights, restrooms, seating, accessibility, sound, field condition

Weaknesses & risks

  • No single public accounting of events, attendance, money in, money out, postponed repairs, or results
  • Easy to neglect precisely because the price tags aren't dramatic

What Portland should do

Count them, sort them, and fund the small fixes.

Group them as a Community & Civic Venues Program with three standards: neighborhood venues that earn their keep (leases cover running costs and wear), cultural venues that need subsidy (given openly, and measured), and public spaces for events (never fenced off just to chase private rental revenue). A modest annual fund here may beat some far larger prestige projects in public benefit per dollar.

Sources:WikipediaPortland Parks & RecreationPortland Parks & RecreationPortland Civic Lab

A prospective asset, not yet an entitlement

The proposed PSU venue

A new ~3,000-seat Broadway-capable hall at Portland State (estimated at up to $449 million in concept materials, $447 million in Resolution 2026-270's), recommended by the steering process in June 2026 and referred toward the full council in August. Today it is exactly one thing: a possible replacement for Keller. Every judgment about it follows from refusing to treat it as anything more until the proof arrives.

Concept demandCredibleFinancing proofIncompleteOperating proofAbsent

Strengths

  • Would solve Keller's failing-building problem with a modern hall built for the job
  • $137.5M in state funding already committed on the record

Weaknesses & risks

  • Money to build it is not money to run it
  • Labor plan, booking agreements, resident-company commitments, and repair fund all unproven
  • The additive trap: building it and keeping Keller too

What Portland should do

Demand proof it can be built and run before committing.

No City-backed construction money until there is a complete budget, every funding source committed in writing, an operator, a labor plan, a realistic budget for running it each year, signed booking and resident-company agreements, a hard legal cap on what the City can be asked to cover, and a plan for what becomes of Keller.

Public record · Oct. 3, 2026PlanningDevelop the PSU Project Commitment Agreement · 2026-12-01View current record →

Sources:Portland City CouncilCity of Portland, Office of Arts & CultureOregon ArtsWatchPortland Civic Lab

The portfolio, ranked

Twelve assets, two axes, one table

The whole portfolio on two axes

↑ demand · knows the economics →

STRONG DEMAND, OWNER IN THE DARKSTRONG AND UNDERSTOODSMALL AND UNEXAMINEDUNDERSTOOD, QUIETER DEMANDHOW WELL THE OWNER KNOWS THE ECONOMICS →DEMAND →Moda CenterProvidence ParkKellerPIRColiseumNewmarkSchnitzerPioneer SquareWinningstadBrunishRQ land & garagesNeighborhood venues

The tinted quadrant is the problem this whole page exists to fix: the assets with the most demand and the most money at stake are the ones whose economics the owner understands least. Placements are drawn from our grades in the table below. They are positions, not measurements.

Moda Center

Demand & utilization
Very strong
Owner economics
Incomplete, contract-dependent
Physical condition
Large identified liability
What Portland should do
Invest only under strong public protections

Providence Park

Demand & utilization
Exceptional
Owner economics
Incomplete but likely favorable
Physical condition
Exposure unresolved
What Portland should do
Preserve; finish the condition study; negotiate early

Keller Auditorium

Demand & utilization
Strongest P5 commercial
Owner economics
Positive earned contribution
Physical condition
Poor
What Portland should do
Keep as the bridge; then replace or give it a new job

Portland Int'l Raceway

Demand & utilization
Strong niche
Owner economics
Positive direct contribution
Physical condition
Reserve concern
What Portland should do
Keep it; bank money for future repairs

Veterans Memorial Coliseum

Demand & utilization
Credible despite closure
Owner economics
Incomplete
Physical condition
Improving through renovation
What Portland should do
Finish it; let it do what Moda can't

Newmark Theatre

Demand & utilization
Good
Owner economics
Likely subsidized
Physical condition
Shared-building liability
What Portland should do
Retain and modernize

Schnitzer Concert Hall

Demand & utilization
Strong cultural
Owner economics
Significant earned deficit
Physical condition
Major capital need
What Portland should do
Keep it; put the subsidy deal in writing

Pioneer Courthouse Square

Demand & utilization
Strong civic use
Owner economics
Mixed public/commercial
Physical condition
Ongoing public-realm need
What Portland should do
Retain with performance agreement

Winningstad Theatre

Demand & utilization
Moderate-to-low
Owner economics
Subsidized
Physical condition
Shared major liability
What Portland should do
Test sharing and reshaping the space

Brunish Theatre

Demand & utilization
Low commercial
Owner economics
Subsidized
Physical condition
Shared major liability
What Portland should do
Keep the programs; make the space earn its case

Rose Quarter land & garages

Demand & utilization
Strong event-linked
Owner economics
Material cash + option value
Physical condition
Highest-use analysis needed
What Portland should do
Manage it as serious real estate

Neighborhood venues

Demand & utilization
Uneven, locally valuable
Owner economics
Poorly documented
Physical condition
Poorly documented
What Portland should do
Count them, sort them, fund the small fixes that pay off
07 · The capital cliff

Everything is arriving at once

Ten separate bills, three with no price tag yet: they cover different years, draw on different pots of money, and some rule each other out. They must not simply be added up. They also must not be faced one political emergency at a time.

Every known bill, one scale

full width = $573M
committedrange floorrange ceilingno public figure
Committed
Veterans Memorial Coliseum renovation$56.0M

Mostly paid for and already under construction: a decision already made, not one still ahead.

On the table
Moda Center initial renovation framework$573M

Nothing is signed yet; the term sheet is non-binding.

State $365MCounty $88.0MCity $120M
Moda additional eligible projects (20 years)$0–$289M

Up to $275M in venue money the City controls, plus $13.6M from the County. Some of it may be paid by ticket and user fees rather than money the City could spend on anything.

Proposed PSU performance venue$447M–$449M

This would replace Keller, not add to it; never stack the two costs. ($449M concept estimate; $447M in Resolution 2026-270 materials.)

Studied ranges
Portland'5 work, roughly 2026–30$29.0M–$54.5M

Rough combined estimates for Keller, Schnitzer, and Hatfield Hall.

Portland'5 work through roughly 2035$115M–$214M

No money is attached to this yet, and it may not cover a full fix for Keller.

Portland'5, all identified horizons$180M–$335M

Adds up studies that cover different spans of years: the same buildings counted more than once.

Unknown
Providence Park–

No one has published a full tally of what repairs this building needs.

? unknown
Portland International Raceway–

The reserves are known to be thin; we found no published long-term repair plan.

? unknown
Pioneer Square & smaller venues–

No single report covers what these venues need or what it would cost.

? unknown

The overlap map: figures that must not be added

01

PSU ↔ Keller: one replaces the other. Never stack the $447–449M and a full Keller rebuild

02

The three Portland'5 ranges are the SAME buildings across different horizons, never additive

03

Part of Moda's $288.6M eligible program may be venue-fee-funded, not unrestricted City cash

The most dangerous scenario: saying yes to everything

  1. 1Build a new PSU Broadway hall
  2. 2Keep Keller running forever as a second big performance hall
  3. 3Fully rehab both the Schnitzer and Hatfield Hall right where they stand
  4. 4Complete the full Moda package and all additional eligible projects
  5. 5Swallow a Providence Park repair bill nobody has counted
  6. 6Keep funding VMC, PIR, the garages, and the smaller venues with nothing saved for their repairs

Every project can be defended individually. The portfolio may still be unable to afford the combination.

Five discipline principles

  • Replace buildings; don't duplicate them
  • Subsidize in the open, not through hidden cross-subsidy
  • Private money pays for private profit
  • Land value pays for district infrastructure
  • Fix what we have before buying nice-to-haves

If Portland tried to do everything

573 + 288.6 + 56 + 334.5 + 449 = $1.70B
$1B
Moda framework $573MModa eligible $288.6MVMC $56MPortland'5 all horizons $334.5MPSU $449M

Say yes to everything and the total blows through a billion dollars. That is the scenario the discipline principles exist to prevent.

The decisions ahead run to the high hundreds of millions, possibly past $1 billion, across choices that overlap. The one thing you cannot do with these numbers is add them all up.

Sources: Moda framework and eligible projects, Portland City Council and KGW; VMC bond proceeds, City of Portland; Portland'5 ranges, Säzän Group / Portland'5; PSU figures, Portland City Council and Oregon ArtsWatch. Unknowns are unknowns because no public document resolves them.

08 · The affordability test

Efficiency cannot solve a capital problem

Finance the Portland'5 backlog with 30-year debt and see what the annual payment does to a system whose whole FY24–25 shortfall was $4.51 million, and whose food-and-beverage program nets $1.7 million.

Start from a real number

$115M
$50M$600M
4.50%
3.00%7.00%
30 years
10y40y
Annual loan payment$7.1M
Portland'5 FY24–25 operating + capital shortfall$4.5M
Even a doubled food-and-beverage program$1.7M

What the debt costs

$7.1M

the yearly payment, level for the whole term

Versus the operating gap

×1.6

the entire FY24–25 Portland'5 shortfall

Versus concessions

×4.2

a doubled F&B program

There is no way to run these theaters efficiently enough to pay their construction bills.

Better concessions, sponsorship, ticketing, and dark-day programming could plausibly improve results by millions. That is valuable, and nowhere near enough. Even an implausibly clean doubling of food-and-beverage adds about $1.7M, before counting the new costs of doing it. The arithmetic is the argument: repairs this size need real capital, not hoped-for operating savings. (Shortfall and F&B actuals: City of Portland / Portland'5; capital ranges: the February–March 2026 Säzän Group facility-condition assessments, Säzän Group / Portland'5, reported at “up to $336 million” by Oregon ArtsWatch.)

09 · The allocation framework

Five gates, one hundred points

Before any project is scored, it must pass five pass/fail gates. Only then do a hundred weighted points force the same questions across every asset, arena and theater alike. Try it.

Example presets: our analysis, not scores of live proposals

The five gates: pass/fail, not tradeable

The 100-point score: seven weighted dimensions

0 / 25
0 / 20
0 / 15
0 / 15
0 / 10
0 / 10
0 / 5

0 / 100

Low priority unless redesigned

The bands are illustrative: the score forces the same questions of every project; it does not make the decision by itself.

Stopped at the gates

Gates are pass/fail, not tradeable. A project that fails any gate is redesigned or rejected, never scored into approval.

High priority

  • Critical structural repairs, accessibility work, and stopping leaks
  • Finishing the VMC work already paid for and underway
  • Keeping Keller alive until its replacement opens
  • Urgent Schnitzer system repairs
  • Providence Park repairs that protect a heavily used stadium
  • Basic records of what we own and what condition it's in
  • Work that makes the Rose Quarter land worth building on

Conditional priority

  • Moda renovation pieces where private money matches ours and the City's return is in writing
  • Providence Park improvements that earn money
  • Newmark modernization
  • Rose Quarter streets and plazas, where they raise the land's value
  • PIR work the raceway's own revenue can pay for

Low priority unless redesigned

  • Running two Broadway-size halls that do the same job
  • Rebuilding Hatfield Hall as-is without first asking whether to consolidate
  • Premium upgrades whose profits mostly flow to private operators
  • Garage spending that bets parking demand lasts forever, without studying other uses for the land
  • Projects sold mainly on big regional economic-impact numbers
10 · The ten-year strategy

August 2026 to June 2036, in four phases

Establish owner control. Stabilize and redesign. Make the major physical choices. Then renew, rebid, and rebalance, all of it on evidence.

  1. Aug 2026 – Jun 2027

    Phase I: Establish owner control

    You are here

    The most consequential twelve-month period in the portfolio's modern history.

    Moda Center: sign only a deal worth signing

    • A fixed City cost, open to audit
    • The private side finishes construction and eats any overruns
    • Binding promises that the team stays, and that they survive a sale
    • Owner data and audit rights
    • The public shares in the big commercial wins
    • Funded reserves for future repairs
    • The December 31, 2026 target must not override deal quality

    Portland'5 handoff: moving a whole business, not signing a contract

    • Choose who runs the theaters next, and how
    • Keep the shows booked; map every union and staffing obligation
    • Transfer or replace ticketing, concessions, insurance, finance, IT
    • Square up event deposits and future bookings; list the intellectual property and customer data
    • Have cash in the bank on day one
    • Stand up the City's own owner team, separate from the operator

    One complete file on everything we own (by June 2027)

    • The legal asset register and a map of every parcel and ground lease
    • A table of every contract right, plus a debt ledger
    • Each building's cash-flow history, and who keeps which revenue stream
    • A repair plan and a current condition assessment for every major building, component by component

    Fill the inspection gaps

    • Providence Park
    • Rose Quarter garages and plaza
    • Remaining VMC systems
    • PIR
    • Pioneer Courthouse Square
    • The smaller community venues
  2. Jul 2027 – Jun 2030

    Phase II: Stabilize and redesign

    Portland'5 under City control

    • Separate profit and loss for each building; track paid attendance and scans
    • Sponsorship and commercial-rights reform; measure dark days and lost bookings
    • Do the urgent 2026–30 building repairs
    • Test whether the Newmark can be split off, physically and financially, from the weaker parts of Hatfield Hall
    • Written agreements on capital costs with the major resident companies

    Rose Quarter: a district master plan

    • Arenas, garages, City parcels, ground leases, plaza, transit, street connections
    • Mixed-use development and Albina-related commitments
    • Don't give away development rights for good until the public knows what the land is worth and how it fits the whole portfolio

    Providence Park: start the 2035 clock now

    • Complete the facility-condition assessment
    • Pin down what the City and the operator each owe every year; put a value on every commercial right
    • Price out extending, rebidding, and the alternatives; start saving for repairs before the deadline forces it

    PSU venue: proof before financing

    • A complete budget, money actually committed, an operator, a labor plan
    • A yearly operating budget, plus booking and resident-company agreements
    • A plan for what replaces Keller, and a hard cap on what the City pays to operate it
  3. Jul 2030 – Jun 2033

    Phase III: Make the major physical choices

    By now Portland should know what the PSU project really is, how the new operator performs, and what Moda and VMC improvements actually produced.

    Keller: choose

    • Close it and give the building a new use once PSU opens
    • Shrink it into a smaller hall
    • Redevelopment partnership
    • Keep only the parts worth keeping
    • Keep operating it only if PSU falls through

    Hatfield Hall: choose

    • Full preservation
    • Newmark-focused modernization
    • Physical consolidation
    • Institutional partnership
    • Partial replacement

    Schnitzer: commit to a phased plan

    • Historic value, acoustics, accessibility
    • Resident companies chip in, and donors help
    • Cultural benefits we actually measure

    Rose Quarter garages and land

    • Redevelop or rebuild based on what serves the public most in the long run, not on keeping every parking space by default
  4. Jul 2033 – Jun 2036

    Phase IV: Renew, rebid, and rebalance

    The portfolio runs like a portfolio

    • Extend Providence Park's deal, or put it out to bid
    • Judge the new Portland'5 setup on its first years
    • Review how Moda performed; review where VMC stands in the market
    • PIR long-term capital renewal; Pioneer Square agreement renewal
    • Shift money toward what measurably works

The 2036 test

Portland should no longer own a venue portfolio whose finances have to be pieced together from scattered public records

Build the PSU hall, or rebuild Keller?

Build new at PSU

  • Keller's building is the problem, not its business
  • The state money is real and time-limited
  • A 2030 opening resets the market

Keep and renovate Keller

  • You don't replace your best earner on a projection
  • $290M is real; 'up to $449M' rarely stays $449M
  • The relationships live at Keller

Where the evidence lands

Replace it, don't duplicate it. And prove it before paying for it.

The full argument

Build new at PSU

The venue fills seats and brings in more than half of Portland'5 earned revenue, inside a building that may cost more to keep standing, long term, than anyone can justify. A purpose-built hall fixes the actual problem instead of pouring $290M into walls and systems that will still be compromised.

A $137.5M state commitment is already on the books. Renovating Keller where it stands attracts no such partner; a new regional venue does.

A modern Broadway-capable hall changes which tours come through Portland, instead of paying 2026 prices to keep 1917 limitations.

Keep and renovate Keller

Keller is the one Portland'5 building that pays its own way. The PSU hall's operating model, labor plan, and booking agreements do not yet exist. Trading proven cash flow for a rendering is how cities end up subsidizing two halls.

Major venue projects run over budget. The renovation has a known ceiling, on a building the City already owns and understands.

Resident organizations, unions, and audiences are built around Keller. Not all of them are guaranteed to follow to a new hall.

The reasoning: The analysis lands where its sources do: treat the PSU hall as a possible replacement for Keller, never an extra hall added on top. Keep Keller running as a bridge, demand full financing and operating proof before the City commits to construction, and decide what to do with Keller only after a replacement is fully up and running. The one outcome the portfolio cannot afford is the middle path: building the new hall and drifting into running both.

The live record

Where these decisions stand right now

Moda renovation & lease

Planning

Next milestone

Return definitive agreements to Council · 2026-12-31

Decision pending

Approve binding lease, renovation and operating agreements · due 2026-12-31

2026-08-12 · Council adopts non-binding term sheet

PSU venue & Keller future

Planning

Next milestone

Develop the PSU Project Commitment Agreement · 2026-12-01

Decision pending

Develop the Project Commitment Agreement with PSU · due 2026-12-01

2026-09-09 · Council adopts performing-arts planning direction

Rose Quarter / Albina redevelopment

Planning

Next milestone

Return binding development agreements · Concurrent with Moda lease; within 12 months of negotiation start

Decision pending

Consider binding parcel development agreements · due Concurrent with Moda lease; no more than 12 months after negotiations begin

2026-09-03 · Council adopts Resolution 37751

Portland’5 operator transition

Implementation

Next milestone

Operator proposals due, 3 p.m. PDT · 2026-10-14

Decision pending

Select operator and approve management agreement · due No public date found

2026-09-10 · City launches operator RFP

11 · The financing doctrine

Ten kinds of capital, matched to what each is for

The order is deliberate: private money first where private profit is created, land value before broad taxes, and the General Fund last: the final source, never the automatic one.

12.1

Private operator and tenant capital

Best for

  • Improvements a tenant wants for itself
  • Premium areas and team facilities
  • Concessions, merchandising, and upgrades that sell sponsorships
  • Operator technology

Risks

  • The public pays for an upgrade that makes money, and the operator keeps every new dollar
12.2

Ticket and facility user fees

Best for

  • Savings for future repairs
  • Fixing up what customers see and touch
  • Debt tied directly to the venue

Advantages

  • The people who use it pay for it
  • Direct connection to use
  • Predictable collection

Risks

  • Attendance rises and falls
  • Higher fees price people out
  • The temptation to pledge decades of future fees to one building

Guardrails

  • Every fee gets a published forecast: gross collections, exemptions, administration, debt pledge, capital use, and the effect on ticket prices
12.3

Parking revenue

Best for

  • Garage maintenance
  • Transportation and district infrastructure
  • Flexible portfolio reserves

Risks

  • Parking money won't grow forever: transit, rideshare, redevelopment, event patterns, and city transportation choices can all shrink demand
12.4

Ground leases, air rights, and development value

Best for

  • Rose Quarter infrastructure
  • Streets, plazas, and public spaces
  • Garage replacement or conversion
  • Capital that unlocks land value

Advantages

  • Potentially Portland's best source: it turns underused public land into lasting value

Risks

  • Development rights quietly handed over for less than they're worth, buried inside a bigger venue deal

Guardrails

  • Independent appraisal
  • Put it out to the market unless that clearly can't work
  • A guaranteed minimum rent, plus a share of profits or rising value
  • Build-by deadlines, or the land comes back
  • Standards for the public spaces, with penalties if they're not met
12.5

Naming rights, sponsorship, advertising, premium revenue

Best for

  • Commercial improvements
  • Capital reserves

Risks

  • Letting an operator retain rights the City never valued

Guardrails

  • List every right (buildings, plazas, entrances, concourses, clubs, garages, transit-facing signage, digital platforms, event series) before letting anyone keep them
12.6

Visitor and lodging taxes

Best for

  • Venues and programs that provably draw visitors from out of town

Advantages

  • Benefits reach the whole region
  • Tied directly to tourism
  • Doesn't lean on the General Fund

Risks

  • Falls in every downturn
  • Competition among Convention Center, Expo, Travel Portland, arts, and sports
  • Treating tourism projections as guaranteed revenue

Guardrails

  • Publish one forecast for all visitor-tax money showing every claim on it in a normal year, a recession, and a worst case
12.7

State and County funding

Best for

  • Facilities whose benefits and tax receipts extend beyond Portland: Moda, Providence Park, major performing-arts venues

Risks

  • Making Portland pay alone for buildings the whole region uses

Guardrails

  • Each government pays in proportion to who attends, who gains the tax revenue, who bears the risk, and who holds control and return
12.8

Philanthropy

Best for

  • Capital projects for the arts
  • Public spaces a donor can put a name on
  • Accessibility, education, historic preservation
  • Programming endowments

Risks

  • Donors fund lobbies before they fund chillers, roofs, insurance, and backstage labor. The finances still have to work after the campaign ends
12.9

Debt

Best for

  • Projects with a reliable way to pay the loan back, or a public duty we've named out loud

Risks

  • Payment plans that start small and balloon later, hiding the real cost
  • No limit on what overruns cost the public

Guardrails

  • Even in a bad year, income at least 1.5× the debt payment
  • Construction contingency of at least 15–20% for complex renovations
  • No blank check for overruns; no balloon payment schedules
  • Required reserves, and the full cost disclosed in today's dollars
  • Stress-test the numbers for attendance, parking, visitor taxes, interest rates, and construction costs
12.10

General Fund: the final source, never the automatic one

Nine sources come before this one. Reaching the General Fund should be a deliberate, publicly defended choice about what the City is buying, never the path of least resistance.

Best for

  • Life safety and legal accessibility
  • Essential public cultural service
  • Civic public space
  • Broad citywide benefits that cannot fairly be charged to users

Risks

  • Becoming the payer of last resort for private upgrades, avoidable overruns, operators who skimp on upkeep, or deals where the public eats the losses while private parties keep the profits
12 · The institutional model

The owner Portland has never built

Not a new operating mega-bureau. Eight to ten people who own the strategy, the data, the contracts, and the capital plan, while specialized operators keep delivering events.

A centralized Portland Public Venues Portfolio Office that owns the strategy, data, contracts, capital plan, and public scorecard, while specialized operators continue delivering events.

The owner team: ten roles

Portfolio director

Accountable executive and Council liaison

Chief venue financial officer

Consolidated model, debt, reserves, operator statements

Moda / VMC / Rose Quarter asset manager

The arena complex and its land

Providence Park / PIR asset manager

Stadium and raceway enterprises

Performing-arts asset manager

The Portland'5 buildings

Capital and facilities director

Condition, components, reserves, delivery

Commercial rights and real-estate director

Every right, valued before it's given away

Data and performance analyst

The event ledger and the KPIs

Public access and cultural-outcomes lead

What the subsidy buys

Contract administration / program support

Compliance and enforcement

What a real owner's office is worth

1% on a $573M project =

$5.7M

That is enough to run a strong owner's office for years; the office itself costs a few million dollars a year.

What the City should NOT take in-house

Concert bookingConcession operationsEvent productionBox-office technologyTouring relationshipsSports operations

The failure is not outsourcing. It is outsourcing without the right to the data, a way to compare operators, a price on every commercial right, real numbers on every event, disciplined savings, and teeth to enforce any of it.

The recommended Portland'5 model

  • One integrated operator for shared systems and labor
  • Venue-level financial reporting
  • Specialized programming or resident-organization agreements
  • Fixed management fee plus carefully designed performance incentives
  • City ownership of customer and performance data
  • Open-book accounting
  • Clear separation between operator incentives and public subsidy

What splitting five venues apart would duplicate

TicketingSecurityStage laborFinanceConcessionsCustomer dataBooking coordinationManagement overhead

The rule: anyone who wants a separate operator for each venue must show, in numbers, that the benefit beats the cost of duplicating these eight functions.

Pay operators for this, not for gross revenue alone

Owner net cashAttendance and paid occupancyEvent diversityNonprofit and community accessCustomer experiencePreventive maintenanceCapital-project deliveryWorkforce stabilityAccessibilityEnergy efficiencyCompliance with reporting deadlines

One Portland'5 operator, or specialized operators per venue?

One integrated operator

  • Five venues, one back office
  • Booking is a portfolio game

Specialized operators

  • Specialists outperform generalists
  • Competition keeps fees honest

Where the evidence lands

Run it as one, program each hall its own way, and make anyone who wants to split it show their math.

The full argument

One integrated operator

Split the system and you pay for eight things more than once: ticketing, security, stage labor, finance, concessions, customer data, booking coordination, and management overhead.

Routing a tour across Keller, the Schnitzer, and Newmark requires one calendar and one negotiator, not three competitors bidding against the City's own buildings.

Specialized operators

A Broadway house, a symphony hall, and small community stages are different businesses. An operator built for each could book, program, and price it better than one manager spreading attention across all five.

A single operator with no alternative is a monopolist with a management contract.

The reasoning: The safest setup for 2027: one operator running shared systems and labor, each venue's finances reported on their own, programming and resident-organization agreements tailored hall by hall, a fixed fee with real performance incentives built in, the City keeping ownership of customer and performance data, and open books. Any proposal to split the five venues must put a number on what specialists would gain and weigh it against the eight operations they would duplicate.

13 · The owner's operating system

Five ledgers, seven tables, eight answers

This is not a glossy economic-impact website. It is an owner's operating system, plus the public-records plan to build it from documents the City already holds.

Asset register

One row per building, venue, parcel, garage, or plaza

  • Asset ID, address, parcel
  • Legal ownership; assessed, appraised, and replacement values
  • Operator, lease term, options, ground leases
  • Revenue rights, maintenance and capital obligations
  • Debt, insurance, development rights, disposition restrictions

Event ledger

One row per event, plus holds, lost bookings, cancellations, dark days, rehearsals, conflicts

  • Venue, configuration, promoter, event type, classification
  • Capacity, paid tickets, scans, comps, no-shows
  • Gross ticket sales, City fees, rent, parking, concessions
  • Extra public-safety, labor, and utility costs
  • Owner net contribution

Operating ledger

By asset and month

  • Earned revenue and public subsidy
  • Rent, user fees, parking, sponsorship, concessions
  • Utilities, insurance, security, cleaning, repairs
  • Operator payments and central overhead, allocated by a disclosed formula
  • Net owner cash

Capital ledger

One row per building component

  • System, installation date, expected and remaining life
  • Condition, replacement cost, urgency, failure consequence
  • Project status, funding source, responsible party
  • Producing: facility-condition index, backlog ÷ replacement value, 5/10/30-year needs, required annual reserve

Public-value ledger

For cultural and civic venues

  • Free events, discounted admissions, nonprofit share
  • Local artists, school participation, geographic origin
  • ADA access, community partnerships, culturally specific programming
  • Subsidy per public-purpose attendance

The thirteen numbers that matter

Owner net cash per eventPublic subsidy per attendeeRevenue per available seatPaid occupancyScanned-to-sold ratioEvent-day and dark-day utilizationPrivate dollars per public capital dollarCapital backlog ÷ replacement valuePreventive-maintenance completionEnergy per attendeeCustomer satisfactionShare of commercial rights retained by the publicShare of projected capital need backed by an identified source

Regional economic impact appears in a separate section, never mixed with owner cash.

One database, seven tables

assets

One row per building, venue, parcel, garage, plaza, or capital asset

contracts

One row per agreement, amendment, side letter, guarantee, or lease, with structured rights

events

One row per performance, game, rental, rehearsal, or activation

cash_flows

One row per transaction, linked to asset, event, operator, contract, period, and funding source

capital_components

One row per roof, chiller, structural element, seating system, or accessibility element

debt_and_subsidies

One row per bond, tax source, contribution, exemption, guarantee, or contingent commitment

operators_and_entities

One row per team, operator, promoter, resident organization, or contractor

Every table links by asset, event, contract, and operator.

Eight questions today’s reports cannot answer

  1. 01Which events create the largest owner cash contribution?
  2. 02Which venues receive the most subsidy per attendee?
  3. 03What capital liability rides on each dollar of annual revenue?
  4. 04Which operators meet their maintenance obligations?
  5. 05What share of every commercial revenue stream does the City retain?
  6. 06Which asset produces the best public value per incremental capital dollar?
  7. 07What happens to the portfolio in a recession or a closure?
  8. 08How much capacity is truly redundant?

The public-records request plan

Published summaries only go so deep. To do this right, we need the records themselves, in machine-readable form:

Financial records (10 fiscal years)

General-ledger and revenue transactions, journal entries, transfers, encumbrances, purchase orders, project and grant codes, cost-center mappings, overhead allocations (as CSV or native exports, not image PDFs)

Operator reporting

Monthly statements, annual financials, event settlements, management-fee calculations, compliance reports, budgets, capital reports, and every underlying schedule delivered to the City

Contracts and rights

Originals, amendments, side letters, waivers, MOUs, assignment consents, concession/ticketing/resident-company/sponsorship/parking agreements, ground leases, guarantees, and default notices, plus a structured rights matrix per contract

Event and attendance data

Event-level: title, category, dates, configuration, sellable capacity, sold, scans, comps, gross revenue, cancellations, holds, lost bookings, load-in/out, rehearsals, private events, promoter

Parking and transportation

Garage transactions, rate schedules, occupancy by event, validations, operator fees, non-event revenue, maintenance, structural assessments, long-range parking assumptions

Capital and maintenance

Facility-condition assessments, component inventories, CMMS exports, work orders, preventive schedules, inspections, seismic studies, ADA transition plans, utility audits, change orders, claims, closeouts, warranties

Debt and public support

Debt schedules, official statements, coverage calculations, reserves, pledged revenue, tax allocations, visitor-facility distributions, General Fund transfers, exemptions, land contributions, and guarantees, each converted to nominal and present value

Property and real estate

Title reports, parcel maps, appraisals, environmental assessments, ground leases, easements, development-rights agreements, air-rights studies, highest-and-best-use analyses

Workforce (aggregate)

Positions, classifications, vacancies, compensation, union, overtime, event and temporary labor, transition obligations (organizational analysis, not personal detail)

Recipients

Spectator Venues, Arts & Culture, Parks, City Budget Office, Finance, City Attorney, real-estate/facilities functions, and Metro/MERC, each asked to identify responsive data held by contractors, not just on City servers

14 · The management judgment

The buildings are fine. The owner is missing.

Portland's venue managers and operators have succeeded at one hard thing: the buildings remain active and relevant. The serious conclusions are about the system above them.

1

The City is not accounting like an owner

A city that cannot produce an income statement for each venue, a list of the rights it has kept or given away, or a forecast of what each building will need is in no position to spend hundreds of millions of dollars well.

2

Capital decisions are driven by lease cliffs and political urgency

VMC, Moda, Keller/PSU, the Portland'5 transition, and Providence Park run through separate processes. That rewards whichever asset has the most urgent deadline, the most powerful operator, the strongest relocation narrative, the most organized constituency, or the most developed funding proposal, not necessarily the highest public return.

3

Commercial and cultural assets are judged through incompatible narratives

Boosters of the commercial venues cite economic impact and skip what the owner actually earns. Advocates for the cultural venues cite public value and skip the hard capital plan. A mature strategy demands both: the moneymakers must show a real public return with risk moved off the City, and the cultural venues must show measured benefits and a repair plan they can afford.

4

The real financing challenge is portfolio sequencing

Portland may be able to finance Moda. It may be able to finance a PSU hall, preserve the Schnitzer and Newmark, renew Providence Park, and develop the Rose Quarter. Whether it can do all of them on their current paths, while keeping basic public assets in repair, has never been shown.

The bottom line

The portfolio has strong demand, valuable brands, important cultural institutions, and exceptional public real estate. The weakness is not the market. It is that the City has never built itself the machinery to run these buildings as one portfolio.

  1. 1Run every venue as one collection, with one strategy
  2. 2Let specialists keep running the shows
  3. 3Keep a real set of books for every building: what it earns, what it costs, what it needs
  4. 4Never blur the venues that should make money with the ones we support on purpose
  5. 5When we build new, we replace the old; we don't pay for two of the same thing
  6. 6If a project mostly profits a private operator, private money pays for it
  7. 7Public money buys public benefits, and we name the benefit we're buying
  8. 8Before raising taxes, get fair value from the land, parking, and naming rights we already own
  9. 9Fund the roof and the boiler before the nice-to-haves
  10. 10Rank every proposed project in public, so everyone can see what beat what

The question Portland should answer in public, every year

Of everything we could do with the next public dollar, which choice gives Portlanders the most lasting benefit, once you count the risk, the upkeep, the subsidy it will need, the money it can earn, its cultural value, and everything else that dollar could have done instead?

Until it can, no individual venue proposal, however popular, can honestly be described as a complete capital strategy.

15 · Method & sources

What we could not verify

The same rule as every Civic Lab deep-dive: judgments are ours and labeled; facts carry sources; gaps are listed, not papered over.

Not yet verifiable from the public record

  • A Pioneer Courthouse Square successor management agreement: we searched council records and found no early-2026 authorization. The last verifiable term is the 2022–25 agreement (Ordinance 190912, $470,000/year City contribution), which expired June 30, 2025. The current arrangement's operative terms are an open question.
  • Providence Park's full repair bill: no comprehensive facility-condition figure has been publicly reconciled. Note also a figure discrepancy: the City's own venue page puts the 2019 private expansion at ~$75 million, while independent reporting consistently uses $85 million; we cite the City's figure.
  • The Veterans Memorial Coliseum figure: ~$56 million is bond proceeds including earned interest per the Spectator Venues annual report; the bureau page separately says $53 million in bonds.
  • A complete public lifecycle plan for Portland International Raceway, a known reserve concern without a published plan.
  • A consolidated condition-and-capital report for the smaller community venues.
  • Portland'5 building-level profit and loss: the cross-subsidy figures are workgroup expense allocations, not maintained venue-level accounts, which is itself part of this page's argument. The capital ranges, by contrast, are now verifiable: they sum from the February–March 2026 Säzän Group facility-condition assessments, across horizons that must not be added to each other.
  • The precise overlap between the $288.6M Moda eligible-projects program and the $573M initial framework, and how much would be venue-fee-funded rather than unrestricted City cash.
  • The PSU venue's cost: 'up to $449 million' in August 2026 resolution coverage, $447 million in Resolution 2026-270's cited May 2024 consultant estimate; both are presented and sourced above.

What is ours and what is sourced

The letter grades, the four-economics framing, the five gates and hundred-point weights, the four phases, the financing doctrine, the portfolio-office design, the debate adjudications, and the closing doctrine are Portland Civic Lab analysis. Every load-bearing figure (dollar amounts, dates, attendance, votes) carries a public source below. Disclosure, restated: our founder publicly runs Rip City Not Rip Off, an advocacy campaign about the Moda Center deal; this page's paid-work firewall and the full policy live on the Independence page.

Sources

City of Portland · 2026 · primary

Metro and City of Portland announce next steps in Portland'5 management transition

City of Portland · 2026 · primary

Request for Information: venue operations for Portland'5 Centers for the Arts

City of Portland · 2021 · primary

Providence Park turns 95

City of Portland · 2025 · primary

Spectator Venues & Visitor Activities 2024–25 annual report

City of Portland / Portland'5 · 2026 · primary

Portland'5 revenue and attendance by venue, FY2023–24 and FY2024–25

City of Portland / Portland'5 · 2026 · primary

Portland'5 financial statement, FY2024 and FY2025 actuals

City of Portland Budget Office · 2024 · primary

Spectator Venues & Visitor Activities Fund five-year plan, FY2024–25 to 2028–29

City of Portland Budget Office · 2024 · primary

Portland Parks & Recreation five-year plan, FY2024–25 (PIR cost-of-service table)

City of Portland, Finance · primary

FIN-3.58: Spectator Venues & Visitor Activities Fund statement (Fund 607)

City of Portland, Office of Arts & Culture · 2026 · primary

Future of Large-Scale Performing Arts program

City of Portland, Office of Arts & Culture · 2025 · primary

Performing arts venues: AMS Planning & Research key findings

City of Portland, Office of the Mayor · 2024 · primary

Moda Center bridge agreement fact sheet

City of Portland, Spectator Venues · primary

Providence Park

City of Portland, Spectator Venues · primary

Moda Center

Metro Auditor · 2022 · primary

Portland'5 intergovernmental agreement audit

Multnomah County · primary

Multnomah County transient lodging tax

Multnomah County · primary

Multnomah County motor vehicle rental tax

National Trust for Historic Preservation · 2016 · primary

Portland's modernist civic landmark named city's first National Treasure

Portland City Council · 2026 · primary

Resolution 2026-270: Accept the Future of Large-Scale Performing Arts recommendations

Portland City Council · 2026 · primary

Resolution 2026-280: Moda Center term sheet

Portland City Council · 2026 · primary

Resolution 2026-285: development partner for city-owned properties adjacent to Moda Center

Portland City Council · 2024 · primary

Ordinance 191857 — Rose Quarter bridge agreements

Portland City Council · 2022 · primary

Ordinance 190912: Pioneer Courthouse Square management agreement, 2022–25

Portland International Raceway · primary

Portland International Raceway: history

Portland Parks & Recreation · primary

Pioneer Courthouse Square

Portland Parks & Recreation · primary

Lents Park: Walker Stadium

Portland Parks & Recreation · primary

Portland International Raceway

Portland Parks & Recreation · 2015 · primary

City Council approves Lents Park ordinance, brings baseball back to Portland in 2016

Portland State University · 2025 · primary

PSU-led Performing Arts and Culture Center builds momentum with $155 million

Säzän Group / Portland'5 · 2026 · primary

Facility condition assessment executive summaries (Keller, Schnitzer, Hatfield Hall)

Portland Civic Lab · 2026 · analysis

Portland's Public Entertainment Venue Portfolio — analysis, grades, and framework

Wikipedia · analysis

Vanport, Oregon

Wikipedia · analysis

Veterans Memorial Coliseum (Portland, Oregon)

Wikipedia · analysis

Keller Auditorium

Wikipedia · analysis

Arlene Schnitzer Concert Hall

Wikipedia · analysis

Providence Park

Wikipedia · analysis

Pioneer Courthouse Square

Wikipedia · analysis

Moda Center

Wikipedia · analysis

Rose Garden arena bankruptcy

Wikipedia · analysis

Antoinette Hatfield Hall

Wikipedia · analysis

Walker Stadium

Wikipedia · analysis

Portland Pickles

Karen J. Gibson (hosted by City of Portland) · 2007 · book

Bleeding Albina: A History of Community Disinvestment, 1940–2000

KGW · 2026 · news

Oregon lawmakers pass $365M funding bill for Moda Center renovations (SB 1501)

KOIN (via Yahoo News) · 2026 · news

Keller Auditorium fate uncertain: Hunden Partners feasibility findings

OPB · 2026 · news

Portland City Council approves term sheet for Moda Center renovations

OPB · 2026 · news

Portland councilors advance plan to develop city land adjacent to Moda Center

OPB · 2024 · news

Keller Auditorium unlikely to survive a major earthquake, city report finds

Oregon ArtsWatch · 2026 · news

Downtown Portland arts centers need $336 million in deferred maintenance

Oregon ArtsWatch · 2026 · news

Clock is ticking for Portland to fund Moda Center, PSU-related performing arts center

The Oregonian (via The Chronicle) · 2026 · news

Downtown Portland theaters still aren't drawing pre-pandemic crowds

Willamette Week · 2026 · news

Council approves Moda Center term sheet to kick off negotiations with Blazers

Willamette Week · 2026 · news

As county passes funding for Moda Center renovation, city tussles over term sheet